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I.

INTRODUCTION

Current United States antidumping law under the Tariff Act of
1930 provides domestic producers the opportunity to petition against
the importation of foreign goods at prices which domestic producers
believe are less than fair value.2 If the petition is successful, antidumping duties are assessed to increase the actual selling price to a determined fair value for the goods.3 This process protects the domestic
industry from alleged unfair price competition from abroad.
The current laws are such that a domestic producer may wield this
petition process for protectionist and harassment purposes, contrary
to the best interests of the United States free trade policy and the
interests of United States consumers, who must pay more for imported
goods. 4 There exists a wealth of support for the current antidumping
1. Tariff Act of 1930, Subtitle IV, Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 19 U.S.C. §§
1671-1677(k) (1982).
2. Id. § 1673(1).
3. Id. § 1673.
4. See John J. Barcelo, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, in ANTIDUMPING
LAW: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 53 (1979).
433
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laws, in large part due to a surge of protectionist sentiments in recent
years. Many domestic manufacturers, in the face of an economic recession, see the shelter provided by antidumping tariffs as crucial for
maintaining market share and outlasting the recession.
This note questions the effectiveness and necessity of current antidumping laws in the United States, particularly in light of their detrimental effect on efforts to liberalize trading practices under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The current source of
justification for these laws, found in the principles of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 5 (GATT), is questioned. Arguments
for maintaining the status quo as well as arguments calling for a
change to or abolition of the antidumping laws are examined. This
note concludes that the economic interests of the United States, domestic producers and labor, and United States consumers would be better
served, and the goals of NAFTA and the FTA more quickly attained,
by abandoning the current United States antidumping laws. A more
6
active application of antitrust law under section 2 of the Sherman Act
and section 301 remedies, 7 where it is necessary to protect important
United States interests, is favored.

II.

BACKGROUND/HISTORY
A.

GATT

In response to the steady growth of nationalistic dumping laws
early in the twentieth century, an international effort was undertaken,
under the auspices of GATT, to encourage open markets and free
trade.8 The goal of GATT with regard to dumping is to limit the abuse
of national antidumping laws by restricting divergences in the enforcement of national antidumping laws.9 Article VI of the GATT states:
The contracting parties recognize that dumping ... is to be
condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an
established industry ... or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. Due allowance shall be made

5. GATT is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5)(6),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950) (as amended by T.I.A.S. No. 1890).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
7. The Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
8. For a summary of early antidumping laws that were the target of GATT efforts, see
Barcelo infra note 33, at 517-24.
9. Ross Denton, (Why) Should Nations Utilize Antidumping Measures?, 11 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 224, 237 (1989).
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in each case for differences in conditions and terms of sale,
for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting
price comparability.
GATT sought to accomplish this by standardizing and unifying the
interpretation of key concepts like industry and injury. 10 Through these
international guidelines it was hoped that antidumping laws in various
nations could be harmonized and legitimized when subjected to internationally recognized and justifiable criteria. GATT sought to remove
the arbitrary character and protectionist use of national antidumping
laws. GATT by no means intended to impose an affirmative duty on
a member nation to prevent its own private firms from dumping.1"

B.

Current United States Antidumping Law
The antidumping laws of the United States originated with the
Antidumping Act of 1916 (1916 Act) which made it unlawful for an
importer to sell merchandise at a price substantially lower than the
actual market value or wholesale price in the country of their production, if done with the intent to destroy or injure an industry in the
United States. 12 Criminal sanctions and treble damages were included
in the 1916 Act. 13 The subsequent Antidumping Act of 1921 (1921 Act)
added the provision of an offsetting duty equal to the amount of the
price differential of the dumped merchandise.14 The Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 (1979 Act) repealed the 1921 Act and amended Title VII
of the Tariff Act of 1930, aligning United States trade law procedure
with international antidumping law. 15 The 1979 Act spells out current
United States antidumping law.16
A bifurcated process must be followed in order for an antidumping
duty to be assessed. First, the Department of Commerce (DOC) must
find that sales in the United States market are at lower than fair
value (LTFV). 17 This is determined by comparing the sales price of

10. Id.
11. Id. at 236.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982).
13. Id.
14. 19 U.S.C. § 202(a).
15. See Michael S. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration,
22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 265, 268-74 (1987).
16. Id. at 269-70.
17. See id. at 270; 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1). Jimmy Carter designated the DOC as the
administering authority. 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
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the same or like product18 in the exporting country's home market
with the sales price in the United States market. If the sales price
in the exporter's home market is one-half percent or greater than the
sales price in the United States market, the sale is at LTFV. is
Second, the International Trade Commission (ITC) must find that
the LTFV sales by the exporter are causing or threatening to cause
material injury to the domestic industry or are materially retarding
the establishment of an industry in the United States.2- This entails
defining the scope of the industry through the use of two tests: competing products 2' and geographical boundaries.2 The Commission defines material injury as any injury that is more than de minimis, 2
trivial or inconsequential; 4 injury is found whenever the "competition
is direct and the price is unfair."If the determinations of both the DOC and the ITC are affirmative,
an antidumping duty is assessed equal to the amount by which the
sales price in the exporter's home market exceeds the price in the
United States market for the product. 26 This duty is paid to the Treasury and not to the domestic producer who was determined to have
been injured.-

18. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10). "Like product" means a product which is similar in characteristics
and uses with the article subject to the petition.
19. Macrory & Reade, Fair Value Investigations under the Antidumping Statute, Fed.
Bar Assoc., Manualfor the Practice of United States Import Law, Ch. III.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(A),(B).
21. Edward J. Krauland, The Standard of Injury in the Resolution of Antidumping Disputes, 1 MICH. Y.B. INT'L STUD. 164, 165 (1979). A domestic product competes with an imported
product if it is either identical with or substantially comparable to the imported product.
22. Id. Geographic boundaries covers the national output of the product by one producer
as exclusive supplier or several suppliers as a group.
23. Id. at 167 (quoting Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland, AA1921-50, USTC Publ. 214 (1967)
at 6).
24. Robert E. Hudec, United States Compliance with the 1967 GATT Antidumping Code,
1 MICH. Y.B. INT'L STUD. 205, 217 (1979). While this threshold is fairly low, there appears to
be a consensus among signatories that GATT requires a higher threshold of serious injury which
the United States has not accepted.
25. Id.
26. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
27. Roger P. Afford, Why a Private Right of Action Against Dumping Would Violate
GATT, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 696, 701 (1991) (arguing that a private right of action would rightly
enable a domestic producer injured by dumped products to recover for damages done to its
business through retroactive application of the duty and payments directly to the injured producer. This might also act as a deterrent to the exporters who test and circumvent the antidumping
prohibitions through evasive activities such as "hit and run" dumping, inventory dumping, short
lifecycle dumping, and diversionary dumping, since retroactive damages would remove the riskfree, no lose aspect of dumping currently).
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III.

ADVANTAGES OF THE CURRENT ANTIDUMPING LAWS

The support of current United States antidumping law rests upon
the belief that it protects United States domestic producers and labor
from the negative impacts of unfair price competition. Supporters fear
that exporting producers 2s and foreign governments 29 engage in predatory pricing behavior with the intent of eliminating domestic producers
from competition with below cost pricing of goods. This allows exporting producers to control the United States market and extract
monopoly profits from sales without domestic competition.30 The result
is displaced workers and expensive adjustment costs to the industry.
These expenses may be wasted if the exporter is only temporarily
dumping goods in the United States market, thereby requiring domestic producers to reenter the supply market after they have been driven
from the market.31

IV.

DISADVANTAGES WITH THE CURRENT
ANTIDUMPING LAWS

An overwhelming number of arguments can be made against the
current United States antidumping laws revolving mainly around the
potential for their abuse through protectionist applications. The first
of the two criteria required for a dumping determination - the sale
at LTFV - leaves room for misapplication and abuse. The result is
that -United States consumers end up paying more for both domestic
and imported goods.

28. Steven F. Benz, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42 STAN. L. REV.
695, 704-05 (1990) (explaining how foreign producers use private financing through monopoly
prices at home, cross-subsidization with other profitable pursuits, and capital markets financing).
29. Id. Foreign governments finance through direct government subsidization or governmerit antitrust exemptions. and price-support cartels. Id.
30. For a foreign producer to carry out a predatory pricing plan, it needs a protected home
market created through high barriers to reentry of goods. This prevents arbitrage whereby
goods are purchased in the dumped market and reexported back to the home market, thereby
destroying the necessary monopoly profits earned by the exporting producer. The exporter is
no longer able to finance below cost sales in the dumped market. See Barcelo, supra note 4, at
59; Benz, supra note 28, at 706-10.
31. It is interesting to note that a central planner in a state-controlled economy, such as
Poland, sees dumping as an opportunity to profit. Dumping allows the country to maximize the
yield of national resources by importing when the cost of goods imported is less than the cost
to produce the goods locally. They may not buy goods when the economic and social costs of
displacing local production is too high. But, whenever the supply of local goods appears stable
enough to justify local disinvestment in production of that good, the central planner will accept
the gift of privately financed or government subsidized goods from the exporting nation. See
Hudec, supra note 24, at 205-06; see also Barcelo, supra note 4, at 63.
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Criticism of LTFV Test

The LTFV standard applied in antidumping actions allows domestic
producers to successfully chill price competition from imports.- 2 The
LTFV standard ignores differences in consumer demand between the
exporter's home market and the United States market. 3 An exporter
with stronger consumer demand in its home market is able to charge
higher prices.m Yet this ability to charge higher prices at home will
condemn its efforts to compete in the more competitive United States
domestic market, since any differential between home prices and
United States prices is grounds for a determination of dumping.A LTFV analysis also fails to distinguish between dumping with
the predatory intent of inflicting serious injury on the importing country's domestic producers and dumping that results from legitimate
business motives. 3- The exporter might be seeking to recover for fixed
costs.37 While these tactics may negatively impact the sales of domestic
producers, domestic producers employ these same accepted tactics
when it comes to operating their own businesses.
Furthermore, the imposition of a duty to raise the price of imported
goods to the home market price is unfair to domestic consumers.
Often, the home market price is based on monopoly power of the
exporter. This duty-imposed home market price can hardly be considered fair to United States consumers- who now have to pay artificially
high prices for goods because of market inefficiencies and abuses in
the exporter's home country.

32. See Barcelo, supra note 4.
33. John J. Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade - The United States and
the InternationalAntidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 503-04 (1972).
34. As in the case of Japan, this is usually the result of a less competitive home market,
high tariff barriers, and other nontariff barriers, which effectively shelter Japanese producers
from foreign competition.
35. See Barcelo, supra note 33.
36. Id. at 510. These include the following: 1) charging low prices to enter a new market,
to create demand for a new product, to retain customers in an established market, or to test
market alternatives in experimental ploy and 2) dumping in the short run in order to continue
to operate at full capacity in the face of a cyclical downturn in demand in the home market. Id.
37. See Barcelo, supra note 4, at 61. Economic and business theory suggest that producers
who have sunk in fixed costs to build up plant and equipment should be encouraged to continue
producing as long as the average price of goods sold exceeds the average variable cost of
producing these goods. Id. This means that the excess above variable costs can be used to cover
at least some of the sunken fixed costs without incurring additional unrecoverable variable costs
of production. To force a producer to refrain from such sales would mean turning away sales
that would have helped cover fixed costs. Id.
38. Peter D. Ehrenhaft, An Administrator's Look at Antidumping Duty Laws in United
States Trade Policy, 1 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 97, 104 (1979).
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Furthermore, the imposition of a home market price is not likely
to deter exporters from dumping. The complexity and arbitrariness
of antidumping rules mean firms are not always aware of their dumping.2 Currency fluctuations - as well as variations between domestic
and exported products in terms of packaging, features, and regulatory
requirements - make it difficult to predict whether or not a product
will be considered dumped in the United States market.
Finally, the laudable goal of persuading the exporter's nation to
open up its country to imports by imposing duties equal to the amount
of the LTFV determination deserves a measure of skepticism. Domestic producers petitioning for a dumping determination "almost surely
are looking for a higher price with which to compete, and would be
dismayed if the only effect of their actions were to open up foreign
markets to greater competition. ' ' 40 Unilateral antidumping actions are
arguably not as effective at encouraging such change as would be
efforts through GATT or through international dispute resolution procedures.41
B.

Criticism of Injury Test

The second criteria - a finding of material injury or a threat of
material injury, as applied in antidumping actions - requires only
minimal standards of injury. 42 Any injury which is more than de
minimis is material injury.- The Commissioner considers the exporter's motivations, industry impact in terms of prices, market share
decline, customer loss, idle capacity, and probability of future injury."
As a result, loss of sales of a marginally efficient producer as a consequence of price competition from dumped imports can result in a
finding of de minimis injury. 45 Under such a low standard of injury
test, only frivolous or inconsequential claims are not capable of passing
muster. 46 The standard of injury should be raised to the level of serious

39. Denton, supra note 9, at 241.
40. Id. at 242 (quoting Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds.
1989)).
41. See Shaun A. Ingersoll, Current Efficacy of the GATT Dispute Resolution Process, 22
TEX. INT'L L.J. 87, 91-92 (1987).
42. See Barcelo, supra note 4, at 56.
43. Bart S. Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United States: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85, 104 (1973).
44. Id. at 105-06.
45. See Barcelo, supra note 33, at 515.
46. Id.
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injury to competition and not competitors, whereby substantial decreases in domestic production, wages, employment, or profits may
be grounds for a finding of injury. 47 Injury should require that an
actual or implied predatory intent to injure domestic competition be
proven.
C.

General Criticism

The ability of the exporter to engage in predatory pricing schemes
with the intention of eliminating domestic producers from competition
and controlling the importing country's market is seriously questioned.- The likelihood that an exporter who has successfully forced
his domestic competitors out of business will reap monopoly profits
from its efforts is dim. 49 Raising prices to monopoly levels simply
encourages others to enter the market, thereby recreating a competitive market. 5° If the barriers to reentry are sufficiently steep due to
the cost of capital or the lack of technical ability, 51 United States
antitrust legislation can be applied to control the extent of the
monopoly price imposed on consumers . 52 Therefore, the need for antidumping laws to protect. domestic producers from predation is not
clear. The need is further questioned when one considers that
monopoly pricing is easier to maintain when competitors do not have
the flexibility to compete with price. 3 The monopoly threat is arguably
greater from United States producers who are sheltered from price

47. Id. at 514-15. "Injury should rarely be found where entry barriers - for example,
tariffs or high start up capital requirements - are high or if the competitive struggle pits a
small foreign dumper against a few and powerful domestic rivals" or where there has been "a
history of price rigidity or oligopolistic price discipline in the market receiving the dumped
goods." Id.
48. Matsushida Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-591 (1986) (stating
that pricing schemes are rarely tried and even more rarely successful).
49. See Benz, supra note 28, at 708; see also Barcelo, supra note 33, at 501-02.
50. See Benz, supra note 28, at 707.
51. "There is never a guarantee that entry barriers will be sufficient. Bankruptcy or plant
shutdown on the part of injured competitors would not eliminate physical production facilities;
these might be reactivated if prices rise." Barcelo, supra note 33, at 502.
52. See Barcelo, supra note 4, at 67; see also, Benz, supra note 28, at 724-25 (arguing that
current United States antitrust laws cannot address government subsidized dumping due to a
foreign government's immunity from judicial action under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982) and the "act of state" defense).
53. "An effectively enforced across-the-border prohibition of price discrimination would have
a serious - perhaps disastrous - impact on the ability of industries to adapt efficiently to
changing circumstances, and in particular on the natural tendency of cartels to collapse through
cheating that typically begins with discriminatory reductions." R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES 15 (1976).
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competition from abroad through the imposition of antidumping duties;
they are, thus, able to claim monopoly level profits from secured home
market sales.
Another serious problem with the vigorous use of antidumping
laws is the possibility that this same tactic will be used against United
States manufacturers who export overseas. This has increasingly become an issue for companies such as Hewlett-Packard Co. 5 and Philip
Morris Co.,- as well as industries such as the United States steel
industry.66 While only eight nations had antidumping laws in 1980,
forty-two countries currently employ them. 5 7 Their justification for
such laws is hard to fault: they are simply copying what the United
States has done since 1921. 58 Making it worse, some of these countries
have not adopted an official administrative structure like the DOC
and ITC, with decisions in such countries made arbitrarily and secretly. This makes it extremely difficult for United States exporters
to combat.65 The leading United States exporters argue that antidumping laws end up "shooting the winners," by penalizing those companies
who are best equipped to compete abroad, and protecting inefficient
companies who cannot.D.

Minivans from Japan: Determination of the Commission
61
in Investigation No. 731-TA-522

An antidumping petition brought by the Big Three domestic auto
manufacturers - Chrysler Corp. (Chrysler), Ford Motor Co. (Ford),
and General Motors Corp. (GM) - serves as a perfect illustration of
the anticompetitive nature of United States antidumping laws. The
final determination of the ITC went against the petitioners, the ITC

54. Hewlett-Packard sold some medical equipment to an Israeli hospital, and it was accused
of dumping products at unfairly low prices to take business from Israeli companies. Robert
Keatley, Antidumping Laws Keep out Goods that Packs Would Ordinarily Let in, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 26, 1993, at All.
55. Id. Philip Morris has increasingly been met with vigorous antidumping rules from the
European Community as Phillip Morris increases exports of its food products.
56. Id. After cutting prices of steel exports to Canada and Mexico, steelmakers in these
countries sought antidumping actions against United States exporters. This was difficult to
contest when the same United States steelmakers were seeking similar protection in the United
States from competitors in 19 other countries. Id.
57. Id. This counts the 12 member European Community as one.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.

61.

Minivans From Japan, UNITED

STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION PUB-

LICATION 2529, July 1992, at A-1 (hereinafter USITC PUBLICATION 2529).
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finding that an industry in the United States was not materially injured
by the importation of minivans from Japan. It is questionable, however, whether the Big Three may not have achieved their goal anyway
of slowing down the tide of Japanese imports while delaying plans to
update their product offerings to render themselves more competitive
with up-to-date Japanese offerings.6 2
On May 31, 1991, a petition was filed with the ITC and DOC by
counsel on behalf of Chrysler, Ford, and GM.- The petition alleged
that an industry in the United States was materially injured and was
also threatened with material injury by reason of the importation from
Japan of new minivans which were allegedly being sold in the United
States at LTFV.- On July 15, 1991, the ITC notified the DOC in a
preliminary determination that there was a reasonable indication of
such material injury.- On January 2, 1992, the DOC responded by
publishing its preliminary determination that imports of new minivans
were sold in the United States at LTFV. 6 Both preliminary steps
completed, the ITC began its Investigation No. 731-TA-522, which
was completed one year and two months after the initial petition filing.
The final determination was 382 pages long.
Petitioners claimed that injury to the domestic industry took many
forms. Chrysler claimed that Japanese dumping was affecting not only
its sales of domestically produced minivans, but also those produced
by its Canadian subsidiary, Chrysler Canada Ltd. in London, Ontario.
Chrysler argued that even if Canadian production was not considered
part of domestic production operations of a domestic industry, the loss
of sales of Canadian vehicles was having a direct adverse impact on
the per unit material costs of Chrysler's United States assembly operations.6 7 Many United States manufactured parts and components that
were used in Chrysler's United States assembly operations also were
used in the Canadian assembly operations. Chrysler also claimed that
the loss of sales of minivans, which are relatively fuel-efficient vehicles
negatively affected sales of its less fuel-efficient vehicles due to the
requirements of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards.6

62.
63.
64.
65.
on July
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at A-3.
Id.
Notice of the ITC's preliminary determination was published in the Federal Register
31, 1991 (56 Fed. Reg. 36166).
USITC PUBLICATION, supra note 61, at A-3.
Id. at A-7.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol7/iss3/7

10

Bailey: Trade Law:
The Protectionist
Use
of Antidumping
PROTECTIONIST
USE OF
ANTIDUMPING
LAWS Laws—Should the L

The petitioners claimed generally that the maintenance of market
share was of vital importance to the industry for two reasons. First,
loss of market share would have negative ramifications for repeat
business 69 since brand loyalty is often set by a buyer's first vehicle
purchase; most minivan buyers were making their first minivan purchase. 70 Secondly, the capital intensive nature of automotive production, with high fixed costs of production, meant that a relatively small
71
change in unit volume may result in a significant fluctuation in profits.
Petitioners also claimed that sales of Japanese minivans at LTFV
acted to suppress prices of minivans sold by United States manufacturers, thereby reducing profits from price increases the petitioners
72
would normally seek were the competition not so stiff.
The ITC's basis for concluding that the United States domestic
industry was not materially injured or threatened with material injury
was substantial. In defining the industry affected, the ITC rejected
petitioner's argument that it consider lost sales of Chrysler's Canadian
subsidiary. 7- In determining the scope of the "like product," the ITC
was not permitted to include the automotive industry, in general, in
the relevant industry which meant that the manufacturing of upstream
parts and components were not included.
Generally, the ITC rejected petitioner's claim that dumped minivans from Japan were the cause of the domestic industry's injuries,
since so many other factors were more credible reasons for the domestic industry's loss of sales to the Japanese. The ITC cited the Gulf War
and the economic recession during the period of investigation as factors
that reduced consumer demand for big-ticket items. 74 Additionally,
since the minivan industry was not yet mature, the ITC concluded
that purchases of Japanese minivans were likely expanding the market
and not necessarily displacing sales of existing models. 75
Furthermore, while Chrysler introduced United States consumers
to the concept of minivans in 1983, the Mazda MPV and the Toyota
Previa were introduced in the fall of 1988 and the spring of 1990,
respectively.76 The ITC noted that traditional automotive product cycles dictated that peak sales volumes were usually attained three or

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at A-57.
at
at
at
at
at
at

A-57.
A-24.
A-8.
A-16.
A-18.
A-17.
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more years after production.77 The peak was generally followed by
incentives in pricing, changes in model styling and standard equipment,
and the introduction of new options. These patterns helped explain
the decreasing profitability of the domestic industry's products, which
were introduced between three to six years before the above noted
Japanese challengers.78
The ITC made a compelling argument that consumers were not as
susceptible to dumped minivans in a minivan market saturated with
price and financing incentives, 79 equipment group discounts, and the
generally high product differentiations.- "Consumers are likely to be
much less aware of or responsive to price changes than they are in
markets where prices are easily observed and compared." 8'
Specific factors contributing to the domestic industry's loss of sales
to Japanese minivans included the unique design and futuristic styling
of GM's APV minivans, which were not well accepted by the market
since its inception.82 Chrysler's minivan sales were directly affected
by a well-publicized "do not buy" recommendation from a high circulation consumer magazine because of problems with its Ultradrive
transmission.8 Ford's Aerostar was criticized for its "truck-like" feeling.8 An industry practice of fleet sales to rental companies also attributed to the domestic industry's woes. These fleet minivans were
typically reclaimed with relatively few miles and sold on the used
market for a substantial discount, undermining sales of new minivans
at full retail.
The ITC also noted that at no time during the period of investigation did Japanese market share of the domestic minivan market exceed
15% in either quantity or value.8 The primary reason for any increase

77. Id. at A-18.
78. Id.
79. Id. at A-19.
80. Id. at A-24.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at A-35.
85. Id. at A-20. The ITC also notes that the industry's labor agreement which shifted per
unit labor costs to producers also is responsible for the domestic industry's lower profit margins.
Id. at A-35. The downrating of one producer's debt rating primarily for reasons unrelated to
competition from the dumped imports had an adverse effect on the United States minivan
industry. Id. at A-35; 57 Fed Reg. 21937 (1992).
86. Much of the detailed data gathered by the ITC during its investigation is confidential;
therefore, only generalities can be made on market share of the respective manufacturers.
USITC PUBLICATION 2529, supra note 61, at 22.
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in Japanese market share during the period of investigation was attributed to the introduction of the Toyota Previa,8 7 which was generally
8 Petitioners also
viewed by the consumer as a higher quality product.A
agreed that Japanese vans were generally sold at higher prices than
a United States product, often coming in only rear wheel-drive with
a short wheel-base version and usually a four cylinder engine. All
these factors differentiated the products and reduced the substitutability of Japanese minivans for domestic ones.
The ITC concluded that although the Toyota Previas were sold at
6.41% less than their fair value and the Mazda MPVs were sold at
12.70% less than their fair value, demand for domestic minivans did
not decrease significantly as a result of this pricing.89 Petitioners'
argument that sales of Japanese minivans at LTFV acted to suppress
the prices of domestic minivans was thus unsubstantiated. 90 In addition, sales of domestic minivans in the "high-end" price range segment
increased to a greater extent than did sales of Japanese minivans.91
Of course, the overwhelming list of factors that the ITC held as
responsible for the domestic minivan industry's problems have been
quickly forgotten. There has been renewed talk of an antidumping
action being brought by the Big Three against the Japanese automotive
industry for dumping practices which are allegedly negatively impacting the domestic automotive industry. The Big Three announced on
January 25, 1993 that they intended to file an unfair trade complaint
against foreign manufacturers for dumping automobiles in the United
States. 9 They subsequently announced on February 9, 1993 that the
action would not be filed, since it was thought that the action would
93
have created a perception that the Big Three are "anti-consumer."
The scraping of the action was also intended to give the Clinton administration time to formulate its trade policy, with hopes that it will
address the domestic industry's hard times.-

87. Id.
88. Id. at A-26.
89. Id. at A-29.
90. Id. at A-30.
91. Id. at A-33.
92. See Carmakers Drop 'Antidumping' Threat, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Feb.
25, 1993, at 119 D2.
93. Ford Motor Executive Charges Japan with Unfair Trade Practices in U.S., INT'L
TRADE REP., Mar. 17, 1993.
94. Id.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE

The best approach to the problem of dumped goods is to directly
identify and address the harm that is caused. The harm in this area
is that done to domestic producers of goods who are eliminated from
the market due to competition from foreign producers in the form of
predatory dumping. In order for this to occur, one fundamental condition must exist. The exporter must enjoy a protected home market
that restricts competition and allows monopoly pricing necessary to
finance the dumping of goods in importing countries.95 Without this
protected home market, arbitrage would eliminate the exporter's ability to receive monopoly prices.A direct assault on this condition is the best method of curing the
ill effects of dumping. Direct negotiation with exporting nation governments for the removal of tariff and nontariff barriers is fundamental
to progress in curtailing dumping.Y Without these barriers, dumping
could not exist. The possibility of falsely penalizing legitimate price
competition at the expense of the consumer would be removed. Forcing
open the exporter's home market would reduce the cushion of
monopoly profits at home which thereby raises the price at which the
exporter must sell goods in United States market. 9s
This also would address a concern many economists have with the
problem of world misallocation of resources. The exporting country
engaged in dumping could raise its economic welfare by reducing output of the dumped article, eliminating dumping abroad and expanding
production of something else.- The truly efficient producers of a particular item are more likely to be the ones producing it when they
are not competing with producers from trade distorting markets. 100

95. See Benz, supra note 28, at 710; Barcelo, supra note 4, at 59-60.
96. Fisher, supra note 43, at 88.
97. Id. (claiming that vigorous enforcement of antidumping statutes would encourage countries with monopoly exporters to reduce their trade barriers). The problem with this argument
is that current antidumping law is not sufficiently sophisticated (nor could it be) to distinguish
between legitimate forms of price competition and injurious forms of predatory pricing behavior.
A direct frontal assault on the root of the problem, i.e., countries with protected home markets,
will more forcefully communicate the desired message: free trade or no trade.
98. Benz, supra note 28, at 711-13. To be profitable, the exporter must sell above marginal
cost and total average cost; by removing his cushion in home market, his United States market
price will more clearly reflect true cost of production figures, thus allocating more accurately
to each unit produced.
99. Fisher, supra note 43, at 90 (quoting De Jong, The Significance of Dumping in International Trade, 2 J.W.T.L. 162, 173 (1967)).
100. See Barcelo, supra note 33, at 499-500.
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Furthermore, domestic producers would no longer be able to restrain competitors with cheaper products that result from superior
technology and innovation, superior management and production practices.101 Nor would domestic producers be able to seek protection from
the importation of goods that consumers prefer to domestically manufactured goods, as was seen in the minivans from Japan investigation.
The benefits to United States and world consumers are undeniably
enormous. Indeed, even Japanese consumers would drastically benefit
from the admittance of leading United States manufacturing and service industries.
More active application of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974102
is necessary to address concerns of dependency on foreign suppliers- °
by protecting domestic industries that are deemed necessary to both
military security and economic strength.- ° This Act gives the President the authority to "enforce the rights of the United States under
any trade agreement' 1 5 and to correct actions by foreign governments
that are "unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or
restricts United States Commerce.'1' °" The effect is to allow for temporary restraints upon imports, permitting domestic industry to adapt
to new conditions of international competition.107
Direct negotiations through GATT are necessary to encourage and
reward free trade and open markets. Renewed efforts on the part of
the United States to abide by this original intention of liberalizing

101. The United States steel industry's use of voluntary restraint agreements and quotas
to restrict the importation of cheaper steel from countries like Japan which pioneered in leading
edge steel technology is a prime example. The protection caused wasteful investment in out-dated
technology which led to the industry's virtual demise at United States labor's and consumer's
expense. See Walter Adams, Import Restraints and Industrial Performance: The Dilemma of
Protectionism, 1 MIcH. Y.B. INT'L STUD. 34 (1979).
102. 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
103. See Denton, supra note 39, at 269.
104. Recognized exceptions to liberal trade consist of restrictions in a country to help an
infant industry, restrictions to avoid sudden stress or dislocation in a given sector or a national
economy, and restrictions to aid in the solving of balance of payment problems. Barcelo, supra
note 33, at 498.
105. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(A).
106. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
107. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade,
100 HARV. L. REV. 547, 582 (1987) (stating that the Escape Clause is a protective adjustment
statute); see also Paula Stern, Regulating U.S. Trade and Foreign Investment, 21 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (suggesting a reform to make the escape clause less burdensome
for a country to utilize by establishing a GATT panel to examine adjustment plans by nations
for relief to its industries, justified use not requiring compensation to its affected trade partners).
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tradelos will reward United States exporters with greater access to
foreign markets-° and reduce the cries for protectionist measures at
home. 110
VI.

ANTIDUMPING LAWS UNNECESSARY UNDER
AND THE FTA

NAFTA

The stated objective of the FTA is to establish a free trade area
between the United States and Canada through the reduction and
elimination of barriers to investment and trade in goods and services."'
The intended result is the creation of a single market with the free
flow of goods, services, and investment within the market, which will
promote efficiency and market competitiveness.112 Similar objectives
are pending with the implementation of NAFTA to extend the free
trade region to include Mexico.
Antidumping laws work counter to the goals of NAFTA and the
FTA by chilling "vigorous transborder price competition that is not
predatory." 113 Antidumping actions might inhibit rationalization by unilateral enterprises operating in both countries, which would undermine the FTA's ambition to increase the global competitiveness of
North America's industrial sector." 4 In addition, antidumping laws
are not needed by United States manufacturers, particularly automakers, who worry that foreign manufacturers will use Mexico as a base

108. See Barcelo, supra note 33, at 498 (explaining that world welfare will be promoted if
barriers to trade are reduced and business concerns are encouraged to compete across national
boundaries).
109. See Denton, supra note 39, at 239.
110. Id. at 267. Denton warns against abolision of national antidumping laws since it may
make the likelihood of dumping greater. Denton supports applying a public interest analysis
whereby the interests of the nation as a whole are weighed against the interests of a particular
domestic industry. Id. This will reveal more accurately instances where the imposition of antidumping duties results in the importing nation being worse off. Id. A more cautious approach
to changing the functioning of United States antidumping laws is a good step, but does not
redress the major violation of free trade: the existence of closed protected markets that provide
exporters with monopoly power which is the source of the dumping dilemma. Id.
111. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, P.L. No.
100-49, 102 Stat. 1851 § 2.
112. Ivan R. Feltham et al., Competition (Antitrust) andAntidumping Laws in the Context
of the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement, 17 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 71, 75 (1991).

113.. Id. at 79.
114. Id. at 80. Australia and New Zealand agreed to suspend the application of antidumping
laws on goods of origin within the two countries, treating instances of predatory pricing through
provisions of their respective competition laws.
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to export to the United States. This issue is addressed by rules of

origin. 115
In fact, predatory dumping practices within the North American
Free Trade Zone are eliminated since the necessary market segmentation, through barriers to trade such as tariffs, has been targeted
under NAFTA and the FTA. The needed protected home market from
which the dumper extracts monopoly profits to fund his dumping efforts does not exist within the context of a North American Free
Trade Zone. Arbitrage, which can only be held in check by imposed
barriers to free trade within the dumper's home market, acts as an
effective equalizer of dumping practices. However, antidumping actions are likely to increase within NAFTA if the laws are unchanged. 116
As tariffs are eliminated, other means will be used by domestic manufacturers to coerce foreign producers to "voluntarily" limit their exports, in effect using antidumping laws as nontariff barriers to trade
7
in a tariff-free trading zone.1
VII.

CONCLUSION

The current antidumping laws in the United States do not directly
address the cause of dumping: exporters with protected home markets.
Therefore, the continued active pursuit of antidumping actions is unlikely in the long run to cure the ills of domestic producers suffering
from the effects of goods dumped into the domestic marketplace. A
more aggressive approach is to undertake to strengthen the principles
of open markets and free trade through organisms such as the GATT
and through direct negotiations with countries to achieve agreements
similar to the European Community, and to those between Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. These efforts, when combined with

115. A common external tariff on goods from non-NAFTA members means that it does not
matter if goods are shipped to Mexico first and then brought into the United States. The rules
of origin provisions in NAFTA will require that, in order for goods to enter the United States
from Mexico or Canada, the goods will have to have a NAFTA member content of a certain
percentage, not yet agreed upon. Any turn screw operation set up in Mexico by a foreign
manufacturer would not cross boarders duty free unless there was a significant contribution or
content from a NAFTA member. Michael W. Gordon, Economic Integrationin North America
- An Agreement of Limited Dimensions but Unlimited Expectations, 56 MOD. L. REV. 157
(1993).
116. Id. at 162.
117. This is in sharp contrast to the European Community (EC), where one Member State
may not charge another with dumping or subsidies. EC commitment to free trade within the
Community is further demonstrated by the fact that Member States do not have the protection

of any "escape clause." Id. at 161, 62.
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the reservation of power to pursue protective actions under the broad
and flexible powers of Section 301 when efforts at direct negotiation
for the elimination of trade distorting practices have failed, assure a
degree of protection for domestic producers without sacrificing the
unquestionable benefits of freer trade.
J. Wesley Bailey

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol7/iss3/7

18

